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cXs labor contests the dinosaur image it will find no easy 
answers. Hard work, careful assessment of options, and a 
willingness to take risks are all required. Without widespread 
experimentation and a significant reallocation of resources 
to organizing, extinction awaits .”
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Richard W. Hurd
CONTESTING THE DINOSAUR IMAGE
The Labor Movements Search for a Future
Prologue
t is M a r c h  1986 a n d  l a b o r  e d u c a t o r s  f r o m  u n i o ns  a n d  
universities have gathered for their annual conference.1 This 
year’s site is the magnificent training facility of the Seafarers 
International Union (SIU) in Piney Point, Maryland. Hundreds 
of acres of rolling farmland give way to a cluster of buildings that 
could easily be mistaken for the campus of an exclusive liberal 
arts college. The grounds border the Potomac River at its widest 
point, just before it merges with the Chesapeake Bay. Constructed 
during the SIU’s heyday, the facility is well maintained but nearly de­
serted. A large old freighter and a few other rusty boats are moored to 
the docks for infrequent use in apprenticeship training. This monu­
ment to the past tells of union decline. Though a financially secure in­
stitution for now, the SIU lost 70 percent of its membership from the 
mid-1960s to the mid-1980s as foreign flag vessels took over shipping 
to and from U.S. ports.
It is ironic and yet strangely appropriate that the AFL-CIO 
Education Department has chosen Piney Point as the site for discus­
sions on the future of organized labor. The conference invites partici­
pants to concentrate their attention on The Changing Situation of 
Workers and Their Unions, a report issued in February 1985 by the 
AFL-CIO Executive Council. Widely viewed as a blueprint for labor’s 
response to crisis, The Changing Situation has stimulated both debate 
and action in the thirteen months since its release.
Two highlights of the conference reflect the dominant interpreta­
tions which vie quietly for acceptance. The keynote address by Tom 
Donahue, secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO, itemizes initiatives in­
spired by the report. A credit card program negotiated with a major 
bank offers union members favorable interest rates. Several experi­
ments are under way to recruit “associate members” among workers 
with no union representation. The AFL-CIO Department of 
Organization and Field Services is coordinating a nationwide organiz­
ing campaign against Blue Cross and Blue Shield, with eight national 
unions participating. Changes are being considered that would make 
local unions’ membership in and dues payments to state AFL-CIO 
councils mandatory rather than voluntary. Three pilot projects are at­
tempting to raise members’ awareness of and support for labor’s polit­
ical agenda. For Donahue The Changing Situation means structural 
changes designed to strengthen the institutions of organized labor.
I would like to thank Nick Salvatore, Harry Katz, and Jeff 
Grabelsky for detailed feedback on an earlier version.
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At a workshop titled “New Organizing Techniques,” a different vision 
is set forth by Joe Uehlein, director of special projects for the Industrial 
Union Department. Uehlein interprets the essence of The Changing 
Situation in one word: “Organize!” He warns that organizing means 
more than selling the services of the union to prospective clients. 
Instead, campaigns should respond to the needs and concerns of the 
workers, and most of the actual organizing should be done by rank- 
and-file committees. He calls for unions to “burn the printing presses” 
and to involve prospective members in plant-gate activities, rallies, and 
songs. He describes a strategic approach based on power structure 
analysis, and recalls Sun Zsu’s advice in The Art of War, “Know yourself 
and know your enemy and you will endure 1,000 wars.” He also sug­
gests that unions emulate Saul Alinsky’s practice of picking tactics that 
are “winnable, and winnable quickly.” For Uehlein The Changing 
Situation is a license to reconsider labors methods and to promote a 
strategy for revival built upon activism, mobilization, and organizing.
Historical Foundation: The Servicing Model of Unionism
In order to appreciate the complexity of the strategic dilemma facing 
union leaders in recent years, it is necessary to review the foundation 
on which the trade union administrative process rests. Fifty years ago 
under very different circumstances, U.S. union leaders made choices 
that shaped union strategy for the next half century. The Great 
Depression and World War II had provided the backdrop for rapid 
union growth. During the 1930s workers’ passivity gave way to mili- 
tance and collective action as they flocked to the industrial unions of 
the renegade Congress of Industrial Organizations. Union expansion 
was aided by a friendly federal government, which first facilitated 
union organization with the Wagner Act of 1935 and then promoted 
collective bargaining during the war to assure industrial peace under 
the watchful eye of the War Labor Board. In the ten years from 1935 to 
1945, union membership exploded from three million to over fourteen 
million, from 13.2 percent of the nonagricultural workforce to 35.5 per­
cent (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975:178). This rapid growth was 
matched by expanding budgets and administrative demands.
Reeling from the spread of unionization and retaining their hostil­
ity, employers sought ways to restrict unions and to stabilize relations 
in order to reclaim managerial authority in the workplace. A central 
part of this initiative was a political campaign that contributed to the 
election of a Republican Congress in 1946 and then culminated in the 
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. The Taft-Hartley amend­
ments to the Wagner Act placed strict limits on workers’ organizing 
rights, on strikes and other forms of direct action, and on unions’ mu­
tual aid tactics, while enhancing the role of collective bargaining in 
part by buttressing the legal status of negotiated agreements.
The external environment helped shape and support the response 
of unions to hostile employers and the Taft-Hartley restrictions. After 
World War II, the U.S. entered a prolonged period of economic pros­
perity which was conducive to stability and bargaining power for 
unions willing to focus on the economic concerns of their members. 
Operating from a position of much greater strength than in the past, 
unions retained the job-consciousness that had dominated this coun­
try’s labor movement throughout most of its history. This focus not 
only made sense in a period of prosperity, it also melded with the sta­
bility objectives of employers. Long-term collective bargaining agree­
ments that spelled out the details of the employment relationship 
became the norm. This rule-based system worked for employers in 
part because state-of-the-art production management relied on in­
dustrial engineering which could incorporate contract specifications 
into the scientific design of the workplace. Employers thereby 
affirmed their authority to make decisions regarding the organization 
of work, while unions retained the right to negotiate contractual limi­
tations and protections for members.
T he n a tio n a l u n io n  evolved in to  a serv ice o rgan ization . T he deta iled  
ru le -b ased  n a tu re  o f  ag reem en ts co m b in ed  w ith  the  increasing ly  legal­
istic g rievance an d  a rb itra tio n  system  to  en h an ce  the  im p o rta n c e  o f  
fu ll- tim e  u n io n  sta ff w ho  developed  expertise  in  these fu n ctio n s. This 
deve lopm en t re in fo rced  a tre n d  tow ard  th e  em ergence o f  a u n io n  b u ­
reaucracy, a trend that had appeared in the new CIO unions in response 
to rapid growth and the attendant need for administrative control that 
expanded upon the traditional top-down hierarchy in AFL unions. 
Although some observers raised questions about the elitism of national 
union officials and/or the metamorphosis of unions into business orga­
nizations, by and large the bureaucratic system was effective at deliver­
ing what the members wanted: steadily improving economic rewards 
and protection from arbitrary treatment on the job.
With the merger of the AFL and the CIO in 1955, the key pieces of 
the labor movement’s administrative puzzle were in place. By 1955, 
unions were firmly committed to an approach that has come to be 
known as the “servicing model” (AFL-CIO, 1988: 6). The elected 
officials and field staff of national unions would focus on collective 
bargaining and contract enforcement. The AFL-CIO would coordi­
nate political activity. The labor bureaucracy would concentrate on 
supporting these functions as efficiently as possible. Under the servic­
ing model, active involvement of the members would not be neces­
sary.
Missing from this framework was any clear conception of how or­
ganizing would fit. There were bold pronouncements of a commit­
ment to organizing the unorganized, but these statements were not 
matched in practice. For twenty-five years after the merger, union 
membership continued to increase, but at a rate insufficient to keep 
up with the growth of the labor force. Furthermore, the character of 
organizing evolved to match the servicing model. Workers were re­
cruited by demonstrating that their organized counterparts enjoyed 
better wages, benefits, and working conditions. Organizers talked of 
“selling the union,” and unions developed “pitch books” that resem­
bled the sales manuals of consumer product companies.
The Decline of Organized Labor
In 1945, union membership stood at over fourteen million, represent­
ing 35-5 percent of the nonagricultural labor force. By the 1955 merger, 
membership had grown to seventeen million, but the share of the labor
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force had fallen slightly to 33 percent. The labor movement continued 
to expand at a slow pace, peaking at just over twenty-three million in 
the early 1970s and staying at that level through 1980. However, the 
unions’ share of the workforce exhibited a slow decline over the same 
period, dropping below 30 percent in 1962 and standing at 22 percent 
in 1980 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975:178; 1982: 409). This slip­
page would have been greater except for the steady growth of public 
sector unionization during the 1960s and ’70s.
The pace of decline in the unions’ share accelerated after 1980 as 
unions suffered an absolute loss of nearly 25 percent of their members 
over the next five years. Although the losses slowed dramatically, the 
share of the workforce belonging to unions continued to slip. In 1995, 
union membership was 16.4 million, representing 14.9 percent of 
nonagricultural employees but only 10.4 percent of private sector 
workers (Bureau of National Affairs, 1996a). Today, unions have about 
as many members as in 1950, but represent a proportion of the private 
sector workforce that is lower than in 1930 before the great expansion 
associated with the CIO and the Wagner Act. A review of the more 
prominent explanations of the decline should put into perspective the 
extraordinary challenge faced by the labor movement.
The twin recessions of 1980 and 1981-82 triggered a shift in collec­
tive bargaining, ushering in a period of concessions by unions first to 
firms in economic trouble and then to other employers determined to 
take advantage of the situation in a reversal of traditional pattern bar­
gaining. Once concessionary bargaining had taken hold, it proved 
difficult for unions to halt the trend, especially given economic pres­
sures that persisted beyond the recessions of the early 1980s.
Perhaps the most important economic stimulus was the arrival of 
the global economy. International competition had been increasing 
for years, but the pace quickened in the 1980s as the share of imports 
increased in a broad range of markets. The process was aided by 
trade liberalization aggressively promoted by the Reagan and Bush 
administrations and culminating in the North American Free Trade
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Agreement and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1994 
under the tutelage of the “labor friendly” Clinton White House.
The external threat hastened shifts in the domestic economy as 
manufacturing firms abandoned old factories in the unionized “rust 
belt” for new facilities in the non-union “sun belt.” The backdrop for 
these dramatic changes was a long-term trend in our economy away 
from production of goods to the production of services. With the 
transition to a service economy came a changing occupational mix, as 
the number of blue-collar manufacturing jobs dwindled while white- 
collar employment in the services expanded. This too was bad news 
for a union movement that had never established a firm base in the 
private service sector.
Even in many unionized industries where employment remained 
stable, there were sea changes that would upset the status quo and 
threaten unions. Deregulation, first of airlines and trucking, then of 
telecommunication, and more recently of the utilities, paved the way 
for the entry of non-union competitors, which took business away 
from established firms and reinforced pressures for concessionary 
bargaining.
Most troubling for unions was their success in the 1950s, ’60s, and 
’70s at expanding the wage differential between their members and 
comparable unrepresented workers since it contributed to the cost ad­
vantage of non-union firms. This advantage enhanced the economic 
incentives for unionized companies to relocate to non-union areas 
and/or to seek concessions. Unionized workers were increasingly con­
centrated in old plants, firms, and industries that had a difficult time 
competing in the deregulated global economy.
* Although some observers argue that economic forces themselves 
provide an adequate explanation for the decline of unions (Troy, 1986), 
a more widely accepted interpretation points to other factors as well. A 
review article by Chaison and Rose (1991) concludes that only 25 to 30 
percent of the decline can be explained by economic change, and that
the most important additional factors are public policy and employer 
opposition to unions.
As already noted, the Taft-Hartley amendments granted employers 
more freedom to fight against unionization while restricting union 
tactics such as organizing strikes and secondary pressures. The full 
force of these changes was not felt immediately because unionization 
was at its peak and new organizing continued (although at a slower 
pace) simply as a result of momentum and union power. In the 1970s, 
with unions already on the decline in the private sector, employers’ 
strategies of resistance to unions became more sophisticated. In addi­
tion, open violations of the law increased dramatically and by 1980 the 
practice of firing union supporters to halt organizing momentum was 
commonplace (Weiler, 1991).
The full anti-union potential of the Taft-Hartley amendments was 
realized after President Reagan broke with his predecessors and ap­
pointed to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) management 
lawyers who were openly hostile to unionization. As the Reagan NLRB 
lent a sympathetic ear, employers were emboldened and acrimony 
during organizing drives reached new heights. Disregard for the law 
continued, but reinterpretation of the law was more important be­
cause it expanded the legally acceptable anti-union tactics available to 
employers. Lor example, while the prohibition against threatening to 
close a plant if the workers voted for a union was retained, employers 
were allowed to make predictions of plant closure based on economic 
conditions, to distribute articles reporting on the closing of unionized 
plants, and to show slides of their own plant padlocked during “cap­
tive audience meetings” held during working time for the express pur­
pose of discouraging unionization (Hurd, 1994).
The Reagan NLRB’s decisions contributed to the decline of unions in 
the bargaining arena as well. In essence, the employer’s duty to bargain 
in good faith was reinterpreted to be a duty to meet for the purpose of 
bargaining. The prohibition on “surface bargaining” also was weakened 
as the definition of an acceptable “hard bargaining” alternative took 
shape. These changes allowed employers to avoid first contracts without 
committing unfair labor practices (Hurd, 1996). They also facilitated the
employers’ union-elimination strategy of hard bargaining to force a 
strike and then hiring “permanent replacements” for striking workers. 
The Reagan NLRB does not get credit for establishing the “permanent 
replacement” option (which dates to a 1938 Supreme Court decision), 
but it did pave the way for the exploitation of this union-busting tactic.
The impact of the Reagan NLRB would have been modest had em­
ployers not been poised to take advantage of this opportunity to 
weaken unions. As Kochan, Katz, and McKersie remind us, the prag­
matic adaptation to unions by employers during a period of relative 
union strength should not be confused with ideological acceptance of 
unions: “In choosing how to respond to both new business opportu­
nities and/or the need to lower costs, the deep-seated preference of 
American employers for operating without a union dominated man­
agerial choices, except where pre-existing high levels of unionization 
constrained this option” (Kochan et al., 1994:12).
In the 1970s, some non-union firms experimented with new forms 
of work organization that emphasized flexibility, flatter structures, 
and greater decision-making opportunities for workers. These new 
forms of work organization, inspired by the concepts of Human 
Resource Management (HRM), resulted in increased productivity 
and improved worker satisfaction in comparison with the rule-based 
system, which still predominated in unionized facilities (Kochan et 
al., 1994:107-8). However, by no means did all non-union employers 
adopt the new HRM model. Many were content to retain hierarchical 
structures and rigid control of production.
Two models of union avoidance also unfolded. The “union substitu­
tion” model relied on the progressive techniques of HRM to offer work­
ers some modicum of voice and an arguably more desirable work 
environment than existed in many unionized facilities. The “union sup­
pression” model relied on aggressive anti-unionism especially during 
organizing campaigns (Kaufman, 1993:142). By 1980 unionized compa­
nies that wished to escape had begun to copy these two options devel­
oped by non-union firms.
The economic pressures that peaked in the 1980s provided the mo­
tive for unionized firms to change. Some chose to work with unions to
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modify the production system, adapting HRM techniques to the 
unionized setting. Others sought to impose new production systems 
either unilaterally, or during the concessionary bargaining of the pe­
riod. Many followed the “greenfield” strategy, gradually replacing old 
unionized facilities and their rule-based production with new non­
union facilities organized along the lines of the HRM model. And a . 
few firms joined their non-union counterparts to take advantage of 
the friendly NLRB and openly attacked unions to eliminate what they 
perceived as “the problem.” The predominant pattern was for employ­
ers to tolerate unions where they were established, but to take what­
ever steps necessary to assure that existing non-union facilities and all 
new facilities operated without unions.
Some analysts have explicitly rejected employer anti-unionism as a 
leading cause of decline. Farber argues instead that the primary cul­
prit is “a decrease in worker demand for traditional forms of union 
representation” (Farber, 1994: 2). Although there is undoubtedly some 
truth in this conclusion, it offers little insight regarding the sudden, 
dramatic drop in union membership in the 1980s. Public approval of 
unions did decline in the early 1970s from about two-thirds (where it 
stood from the late 1940s through the 1960s) to just under 60 percent. 
But there was no subsequent change of any magnitude, with approval 
at 58 percent in 1985 (Lipset, 1986:301). Rather than a shift in attitudes 
toward unions per se, Farber’s research may well be capturing the 
combined effects of economic forces, hostile public policy, and em­
ployer opposition. These influences combined to weaken labor s bar­
gaining power and to increase the risk for individual workers brave 
enough to openly support unionization. The net impact naturally 
would be a decrease in demand for representation.
As they entered the 1980s, unions carried with them two hidden li­
abilities. First, the focus on collective bargaining and the grievance 
and arbitration system had produced rigid rule-based contracts, 
which created problems during an era when firms sought flexibility in
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order to react more quickly to economic change. This situation was 
exacerbated as unions resisted proposals to move toward the HRM- 
based systems of work organization. This initial reluctance was un­
derstandable because the new methods had been developed in the 
non-union sector and because some unionized firms attempted to 
impose this approach unilaterally outside of collective bargaining. 
Nonetheless, the commitment of unions to the traditional framework 
merely increased the appeal of the non-union option for their reluc­
tant partners in management.
A second liability for unions was the reliance on the servicing 
model and consequent neglect of the organizing function. Although 
inertia had assured natural membership growth early in the post- 
World War II period, by 1980 that momentum was gone, at least in the 
private sector. In 1970, unions added 0.5 percent of the private sector 
workforce to their ranks through NLRB elections. By 1980 this share 
had fallen to 0.25 percent and by 1985 to 0.1 percent (Freeman and 
Rebick, 1989:31). Thus, organizing activity in 1985 was less than one- 
half of the 1980 level and less than one-quarter of the 1970 level.
From the perspective of unions in the 1980s, the drop in organizing 
activity was rational. With heightened employer opposition and an un­
friendly NLRB, spending money on organizing appeared to be a poor 
investment. The decline in membership strained budgets, and consis­
tent with their strategic model, unions placed priority on preserving 
the quality of representational services. Furthermore, the obvious de­
cline in union effectiveness during a period of concessionary bargain­
ing created problems for organizers accustomed to “selling the union” 
by stressing the services it could offer. The low level of organizing fur­
ther complicated the problems for unions, which needed new mem­
bers to counteract the loss of unionized jobs in many industries.
The reliance on the servicing model also may have contributed to 
labor’s problems in a more subtle way. Over time, this strategic ap­
proach deadened the activism and commitment of members. As
workers who participated in the excitement associated with the hey­
day of the CIO moved on and retired, they were replaced by others 
with no connection to organizing or to labor as a movement. They 
tended to view the union as a third party and to accept uncritically 
the expertise of the union representative in arbitrations and bargain­
ing. The passivity of members that evolved should come as no sur­
prise since under the servicing model the nerve of personal 
involvement had been severed long ago. You might conclude that by 
the 1980s the labor movement had lost its soul.
The Strategic Response to Crisis in the Kirkland Era
Responding to the crisis was not a simple matter. The natural tendency 
was to seek top-down solutions within the context of the servicing 
model, which had served the labor movement effectively for nearly 
four decades. Thus, when employer opposition to organizing in­
creased, the unions reacted with a call for labor law reform. A proposal 
introduced with the support of the Carter administration in 1977 
would have enhanced the potential for organizing success by increas­
ing penalties for labor law violations, granting unions more access to 
workers, and speeding up the NLRB representation election process. In 
spite of majority support in both houses of Congress, the proposal 
failed in 1978 at the hands of a Republican filibuster in the Senate.
When labor leaders in the 1980s faced the triple threat of economic 
restructuring, the Reagan administration, and increasing employer 
hostility, they were stymied. As membership and revenues plum­
meted, national unions scrambled to keep their heads above water. In 
the early 1980s, serious consideration of any dramatic shift in strategy 
was out of the question for most unions as concern for institutional 
preservation prevailed. The difficulty in responding decisively can be 
traced in part to the symbiosis between the union bureaucracy and 
the internal political concerns of union leaders. Because union officers 
at all levels must stand for election periodically, a premium is placed 
on satisfying members. The servicing model had done that for years. 
Also, most elected leaders had risen to their positions based on expe­
rience gained within the context of this model. Similarly, the experts 
who staffed the union bureaucracy had gained their positions because 
of competence in functions related to servicing.
To complicate the situation, AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland was 
himself a career labor bureaucrat. Having never participated in orga­
nizing, led a strike, or even bargained a contract, and almost totally 
cut off from rank-and-file union members, he was especially ill 
equipped to craft a compelling alternative vision. Rather than consid­
ering serious change, the tendency for leaders and staff from Kirkland 
on down was to blame failures on external forces, to justify policies by 
past successes, and to avoid the difficult question of strategic transfor­
mation (Lawler, 1990: 48-49).
In spite of this ingrained institutional rigidity, the external threat 
was so great that most leaders of national unions began to search ten­
tatively for a way out of their predicament. In 1982, informal discus­
sions gave way to formal action. The AFL-CIO Executive Council 
formed the Committee on the Evolution of Work. Under the chair­
manship of AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Tom Donahue, this com­
mittee provided a forum for union presidents to consider the 
challenges and choices they faced. The importance attached to the 
discussions is reflected by the participation of the presidents from 
eight of the nine largest affiliated unions. The Changing Situation of 
Workers and Their Unions (AFL-CIO, 1985b), the report issued by the 
committee in 1985, officially encouraged unions to experiment with 
new tactics and strategies.
Although labor maybe faulted for a slow and/or incomplete re­
sponse, in fact most national unions eventually altered or at least fine- 
tuned their strategies. Few unions made the choice merely to preserve 
the status quo. Consistent with the recommendations of The Changing 
Situation, a variety of courses were followed.
Improvements in Administrative Structure and Service Delivery
Faced with tight budgets, many national unions launched initiatives to 
improve administrative efficiency. The AFL-CIO’s George Meany 
Center developed a program for trade union administrators, and indi­
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vidual unions increased support for staff training. The search for ad­
ministrative efficiency during a period of declining membership pre­
cipitated numerous mergers and affiliations. Unions began to engage 
in strategic planning, many for the first time.
In an effort to enhance labor’s public image, the AFL-CIO intro­
duced a marketing campaign with the theme “Union Yes.” In addition, 
the AFL-CIO established the Union Privilege Benefits program, which 
offered direct benefits such as low-interest credit cards to members of 
affiliated unions. With the encouragement of the AFL-CIO, several 
unions established a new category of “associate members,” who could 
take advantage of the benefits offered by Union Privilege and be non­
voting members of the union even though they were not employed in 
a unionized workplace.
These administrative changes improved the effectiveness of unions 
in some ways, but none of them challenged the prevailing servicing 
model. In fact, the Union Privilege Benefits program could be viewed 
as a consummate version of the servicing model since members and 
associate members can take advantage of the benefits with no per­
sonal relation at all with a representative of the union. Even strategic 
planning, as practiced by most unions, was limited to more clearly 
defining objectives rather than challenging those objectives. Most of 
the administrative improvements were conceived and implemented at 
the top of the labor movement, with little involvement by or direct 
influence on the members.
Political Action
Ronald Reagan served as a convenient target because of his open hostil­
ity to unions. Since the AFL-CIO’s leadership role is most clearly 
evident in the political arena, and most national unions are headquar­
tered in Washington, D.C., it is not surprising that the quest for a politi­
cal solution to labor’s plight proved to be irresistible. The attraction was 
particularly strong because labor law reform had been so close in 1978.
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Starting with the endorsement of Walter Mondale for president in 
1984prior to the Democratic primaries (a break with tradition), the 
AFL-CIO stayed the course with dogged determination. Coordination 
of campaign contributions to congressional races by the unions’ politi­
cal action committees became more sophisticated (Hurd and Sohl, 
1992), and there were even a few notable successes on Capitol Hill like 
plant closing legislation. Finally, in 1992, labor’s patient commitment to 
a political solution seemed to pay off with the election of Bill Clinton.
The new president promised to push for passage of the Workplace 
Fairness Act, which banned the practice of hiring permanent replace­
ments for strikers. Furthermore, early in the new administration, 
Secretary of Labor Robert Reich met with the AFL-CIO Executive 
Council at its annual winter retreat in Bal Harbour, Florida, and 
promised to deal with labor’s number one concern: labor law reform. 
Shortly thereafter, the Commission on the Future of Labor 
Management Relations was appointed, with John Dunlop serving as 
chairperson. It would be difficult to overstate the degree of hope in­
spired in Lane Kirkland, the leaders of national unions, and the AFL- 
CIO staff by the election of Bill Clinton and the subsequent 
appointment of the Dunlop Commission.
The labor movement’s heightened reliance on political action may 
at first appear to signal a significant shift in strategy. However, the 
focus on lobbying, endorsements, and campaign contributions was 
well within the traditions of the AFL-CIO and consistent with the ser­
vicing model. The political solution, however, proved to be phantas- 
mic. The Workplace Fairness Act suffered a familiar fate, killed by a 
Senate filibuster. Any chance for significant union-friendly labor law 
reform was wiped out by the collapse of the Democratic Congress in 
the 1994 elections, two months before the release of the Dunlop 
Commission’s recommendations, which were a major disappoint­
ment. The Dunlop Commission called for modest improvements in 
the NLRB representation election process, but these were to be “bal­
anced” by relaxation of restrictions on employer-dominated labor or­
ganizations (“company unions” ). The proposals were well short of ex­
pectations, with no increase in penalties for violations of the law, no 
improvement in union access to workers to counter employers’ captive 
audience meetings, and no substantive challenge to surface bargaining 
during first contract negotiations.
New Bargaining Strategies
After initial resistance to employer-designed schemes to reorganize 
work, unions adapted. They concluded that reorganization need not 
threaten the union as an institution so long as its role as bargaining 
agent was preserved. The change in attitude came from two directions. 
In some unions, locals began to accept management proposals in an ef­
fort to preserve jobs. The national unions eventually abdicated to real­
ity as more and more locals gained experience with new structures of 
work. In other unions, national leaders saw an opportunity to enhance 
member satisfaction and job security by negotiating partnership 
clauses in national agreements to facilitate work reorganization. Finally, 
in 1994, the AFL-CIO Committee on the Evolution of Work confirmed 
the shift in labor’s position with the release of a report, The New 
American Workplace: A Labor Perspective (AFL-CIO, 1994). Labor’s ac­
ceptance of new forms of work organization was by no means univer­
sal, but the majority of labor leaders agreed to some form of joint 
decision making as desirable, or at least inevitable. The most successful 
relationships have evolved in those industries where employment is rel­
atively stable and the union’s bargaining position is secure.
The support for labor-management partnerships is parallel in many 
ways to the post-World War II experience with industrial engineering. 
Unions accommodated to management’s view of state-of-the-art work 
organization and adopted new approaches to bargaining consistent 
with the new reality. The adaptation of unions to employer initiatives to 
reorganize work represents a break with the past to the extent that the 
rule-based agreements of old are replaced by more flexible documents. 
The transition was facilitated by the rapid spread of mutual gains bar­
gaining, which preserved the bargaining role for unions. Thus, the ser­
vicing model persisted although the tone of the union’s relationship
with the employer changed and the context of the unions role as bar­
gaining representative was in the process of being redefined.
New Sources of Power
With the decline in the effectiveness of strikes, many unions focused 
their attention on developing alternative sources of power. The most 
widely accepted technique came to be known as the “corporate cam­
paign.” Corporate research identifies lenders, investors, customers, 
suppliers, stockholders, and directors who might be influenced to 
apply pressure on the employer. Some campaigns reach out to govern­
ment regulatory agencies, elected officials, or potential community al­
lies who might be able to assist. The idea aims to match the unions 
strength against the employers weakness. Whatever the source, the 
external pressure on the employer increases the cost of continued re­
sistance and thereby makes settlement more attractive.
Although innovative, corporate campaigns do not necessarily 
conflict with the servicing model. The campaigns can be conducted 
by the national unions staff, with a prominent role for those who are 
experts in research and public relations. There is little need to involve 
local leaders or members. In practice, most corporate campaigns have 
been implemented only after traditional bargaining has failed and a 
traditional strike has collapsed or has been rejected by an apprehen­
sive rank and file.
Renewed Interest in Organizing
By the mid-1980s, a near consensus existed within the labor move­
ment that greater attention to organizing was required. Much of the 
discussion and recommendations in The Changing Situation dealt di­
rectly with some aspect of organizing. However, during a period of 
tight budgets, it was not easy for unions to fund major new initiatives. 
The importance of organizing was heralded in conference resolutions, 
speeches, and union newspapers, but the rhetoric did not translate 
readily into action. Some unions did increase resources and reassign 
staff to organizing, but these initiatives foundered initially under the 
weight of outmoded techniques and an ineffective sales pitch.
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Symbolic of the difficulties encountered, the campaign sponsored 
by the AFL-CIO Executive Council against Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
failed. The campaign had been introduced with great fanfare in 
August 1985 by Lane Kirkland: “ The Blue Cross and Blue Shield cam­
paign is a new organizing model which . . .  implements many of the 
recommendations from The Changing Situation” (AFL-CIO, 1985a). 
However, months of bureaucratic delays took their toll. By the time 
agreement was reached on which state Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
plans would be assigned as a target for each of the eight participating 
unions, the company had implemented an effective anti-union pro­
gram. Even without the delays, the campaign might have collapsed on 
its own since there was never any evidence that the employees desired 
union representation (Northrup, 1990).
In spite of these difficulties and disappointments, the commitment 
to organizing did not fade. Burned by the Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
experience, and urged on by member unions, which were encounter­
ing their own difficulties in the organizing arena, the AFL-CIO shifted 
its approach. In 1989 the Executive Council endorsed the creation of 
an independent entity, the Organizing Institute, “to enhance union or­
ganizing and to enhance the skills of union organizers.” The 
Organizing Institute would report directly to Tom Donahue and 
would be funded largely by unions that chose to sponsor it and take 
advantage of the training it offered. Richard Bensinger, a creative and 
successful organizer with the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile 
Workers Union (ACTWU), was hired as director.
Under Bensinger’s leadership, the Organizing Institute was highly 
visible. By 1995, over one thousand organizers had participated in its 
innovative training program. The training promotes an approach to 
organizing that focuses on building the union around the concerns of 
workers rather than selling the services of the union to workers. In ad­
dition to training organizers, the institute aggressively pursued its 
charge “to advance union organizing.” The organizing directors of the
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fifteen sponsoring unions met regularly to discuss their experiences. 
The institute’s Elected Leader Task Force brought together regional di­
rectors and presidents of large locals who had demonstrated commit­
ment and success in the pursuit of aggressive organizing programs. 
Both of these forums promoted cross-cultivation and cooperation, 
which have been rare in a labor movement where individual national 
unions tend to be very protective of their internal affairs. In conjunc- 
. tion with the sponsoring unions, the Organizing Institute advanced 
the position that unions must be seen as vehicles for social and eco­
nomic justice if they hope to survive.
Another advance that elevated the importance of organizing de­
serves attention. Fifteen construction unions joined with the AFL- 
CIO Building and Construction Trades Department in a massive 
nationwide effort to educate members in order to win their support 
for (and occasional involvement in) rank-and-file organizing. A pro­
gram known as COMET (Construction Organizing Membership 
Education and Training), developed by the International Brotherhood 
of Electrical Workers in conjunction with Cornell University’s School 
of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR), had reached over 100,000 
union members by the end of 1994. The message of COMET is consis­
tent with the traditions of job-conscious unionism: the rationale for 
organizing is to increase the market share of unionized construction 
and take wages out of competition. Nonetheless, the program chal­
lenges the servicing model because it seeks member support in order 
to create bottom-up pressure for organizing. With construction 
unions promoting an organizing vision, this initiative has the poten­
tial to “reinvent organizing unions” in this important industry 
(Grabelsky and Hurd, 1994).
Although the COMET program can stimulate rank-and-file support 
for organizing and the Organizing Institute can play the role of catalyst, 
real strategic change can occur only within the national unions. Most of 
the unions associated with these two initiatives demonstrated renewed
commitment to organizing in the early 1990s that clearly transcended 
rhetoric and superficial gestures. Although some unions with coura­
geous organizing objectives still approached the challenge as if it were a 
marketing campaign, most rejected this conception in favor of a pro­
gram to build the union by empowering workers to organize them­
selves. A dozen or more unions with aggressive grassroots programs led 
an effort to reestablish organizing as the central tenet of the labor move­
ment and in the process struggled to break free from the constraints of 
the servicing model. Among all of the strategic responses to crisis dur­
ing the Kirkland era, the shift in focus from servicing to organizing of­
fered the greatest promise for the future of unions.
Contesting the Dinosaur Image
In his provocative book Which Side Are You On?, Thomas Geoghegan 
captured a popular image of unions with his depiction of “a dumb, 
stupid mastodon of a thing, crawling off to Bal Harbour to die” 
(Geoghegan, 1992:37). In recent years, friends of labor like Geoghegan 
have raised penetrating questions about the current and future state 
of the labor movement. Nick Salvatore’s description of labor’s grim 
prospects hits the mark with the reflection that “the specter of wide­
spread skepticism is the most frightening possibility” (Salvatore, 1992: 
92).
Although there is ample basis for skepticism, the actions by labor in 
response to crisis during the Kirkland years, as described, belie the 
image of a decrepit beast lumbering off to its burial ground. Indeed, 
Bal Harbour was the site for the unveiling of The Changing Situation 
in 1985 and the release of The New American Workplace in 1994. It is 
important to recognize the depth and breadth of labor’s vigilance as it 
struggled to weather the storm. To his credit, Tom Donahue led the 
search for new strategies and to his credit, Lane Kirkland encouraged 
the effort. Although concerns for institutional preservation may have 
inhibited creativity, the very fact that the AFL-CIO officially sanc­
tioned the consideration of nontraditional alternatives was useful.
This encouragement provided a rationale for experimentation and
risk-taking in national unions. However, the maneuvering and mod­
est innovations neither solved labor’s problems nor set the movement 
on course for inevitable renaissance.
With the persistent difficulties labor’s image slowly diminished. 
Once reviled and respected for its political influence and economic 
power, by 1995 the labor movement was widely viewed as an anachro­
nism. Being Heard, a 1994 report prepared for the AFL-CIO, used sur­
vey research and focus groups to assess public attitudes toward 
unions. In essence, the report’s conclusion concurred with 
Geoghegan’s observation, at least so far as labor’s image is concerned: 
“Mostly unions are discussed as something no longer relevant, as 
symbolized in the frequently used shorthand ‘They’re dinosaurs’ ” 
(Greer et al., 1994:12).
The Structural Fix Temptation
The labor movement’s response languished in part because it was dri­
ven by concern for institutional preservation. Associate memberships, 
union credit cards, political action, labor-management partnerships, 
and corporate campaigns, though innovative and testaments to labor’s 
adaptability, did not challenge the institutional inertia that inhibited 
radical transformation. Labor’s response was modest by design. The 
objective was to adapt, not to transform. The AFL-CIO and affiliated 
national unions sought a pragmatic structural fix.
The primacy afforded to institutional preservation unintentionally 
contributed to labor’s dinosaur image. Being Heard called attention to 
three related critiques. First, unions are viewed as “ institutions, not 
people” ; second, unions are seen as “bastions of special privilege” ; and 
third, there is “a sense that unions are not truly accountable to their 
members.” As the consultants explained, “When people think of 
unions they see impersonal and inward looking organizations, rather 
than America’s working men and women__ Many Americans con­
sider unions to be bureaucratic institutions, with an agenda driven 
primarily by organizational needs” (Greer et al., 1994:11,15,16).
The objective of Being Heard was to help the AFL-CIO improve its 
“strategic communications” in order to improve this unflattering
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image. The result was a new advertising campaign, unveiled in 1995, 
which delivered the following message: “We’re the men and women 
of the AFL-CIO, and we’re standing up for good jobs, wages, health 
and safety, and a real voice at work” (Labor Institute of Public 
Affairs, 1995: 5). In effect, the AFL-CIO under Lane Kirkland viewed 
the dinosaur image as a communications challenge.
An alternate interpretation of the survey results would conclude 
that special privilege, lack of accountability, and institutional rigidity 
are real problems, not simply a public relations dilemma. If this is the 
case, then the dinosaur image may be seen more accurately as a reflec­
tion of the inability of unions to adapt effectively to a new environ­
ment. Perhaps the servicing model and its supporting bureaucracy 
have not been able to accommodate to the extent of innovation re­
quired. According to this diagnosis, if unions hope to improve their 
image, they need to concentrate on changing their practice.
The Elusive Organizing Model
While the Evolution of Work Committee sought top-down answers to 
unions’ problems, in some corners of the labor movement progressive 
leaders and staff members began to advocate change from the bottom 
up. The Industrial Union Department (IUD) promoted The Inside 
Game (AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department, 1986), which de­
scribed how internal organizing could be integrated with corporate 
campaigns. The idea was to tap the abilities and collective potential of 
members by involving them in workplace rallies, work-to-rule, and 
other forms of concerted action. Because they facilitated workers’ self­
organization and provided space for members to make their own de­
cisions and take credit for their own accomplishments, these “ inside 
games” represented a break from the servicing model at least for the 
duration of the corporate campaign.
Subsequently, the Service Employees International Union in the 
Contract Campaign Manual (SEIU, 1988) and the Communications
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Workers of America in its Mobilizing for the ’90s (CWA, 1990) ex­
tended the IUD’s idea. Both of these unions encouraged locals to con­
duct internal organizing in advance of contract negotiations 
regardless of whether an external corporate campaign was deemed 
appropriate. The message to locals was that by activating members 
and applying pressure on the employer in the workplace, the union 
could increase bargaining leverage. The implicit common thread in 
. these initiatives was to apply internally a union building approach to 
mobilizing members that paralleled the Organizing Institute’s external 
organizing philosophy.
The affinity between mobilization and external organizing was elu­
cidated by proponents of an “organizing model of unionism.” 
Appropriately, the concept was first described and contrasted to the 
servicing model during a 1988 teleconference on internal organizing 
sponsored by the AFL-CIO and inspired by The Changing Situation 
(AFL-CIO, 1988). Under the organizing model, the role of the union 
would be to help workers find collective solutions to their work- 
related concerns. Whether the local union was seeking recognition, 
negotiating a contract, or enforcing the contract, the organizing 
model suggested that the union’s power would be enhanced by orga­
nization, activism, and militance by members in the workplace. The 
most ardent missionaries for the organizing model posited that mobi­
lization of members ultimately would reduce their reliance on the 
union for servicing and representational functions and thereby free 
resources and staff for other pursuits (Banks and Metzgar, 1989).
Initial enthusiasm among adventuresome unionists for the orga­
nizing model ultimately has waned in the face of internal resistance. 
Officers and staff, comfortable with their traditional roles, have dis­
played a reluctance to reduce services compounded by a fear of the 
unknown. For the most part, members have accommodated to this at­
tachment to the servicing model. Even those unionists who view orga­
nizing as the top priority have struggled with the relationship between 
servicing and organizing. Some have pointed out that organizing suc­
cess depends in part on the union’s reputation in servicing; and yet 
the reality is that the only way to increase organizing on a significant 
scale is to shift resources away from servicing. Most important, mobi­
lization has proven to be harder and more staff-intensive than tradi­
tional servicing. This has raised concerns about draining already 
limited resources away from organizing.
These barriers have led many unionists to conclude that the “orga­
nizing model” vs. “servicing model” debate is counterproductive. 
Upon reflection, the organizing model is not a fully developed con­
struct that can be appropriately counterpoised to the entrenched ser­
vicing model. Although committed to organizing, unionists who 
criticize the servicing model have shifted their focus to building an 
“organizing culture,” or promoting “transformation” to a new style of 
unionism not yet clearly defined (Fletcher and Hurd, 1998).
Organizing for the Future
Dissatisfaction with Lane Kirkland’s risk-averse management of the 
AFL-CIO grew as it became clear that the Clinton administration was 
not likely to expedite labor’s renewal. Impatient with the federation’s 
inertia and public image, several national union presidents began to 
discuss the need for new leadership. In the aftermath of the November 
1994 election defeat of the Democratic Congress and the concomitant 
death blow to labor’s political agenda, the revolt went public.
When efforts to orchestrate a peaceful transfer of power failed, 
Kirkland’s detractors announced that they would mount a challenge 
at the October 1995 AFL-CIO convention. John Sweeney, president of 
SEIU (the federation’s fast-growing affiliate) headed a slate also in­
cluding Rich Trumka, the militant president of the United Mine 
Workers, and Linda Chavez-Thompson of the American Federation 
of State, County, and Municipal Employees. Kirkland stepped aside in 
favor of Donahue, who was joined by Barbara Easterling of CWA on 
the incumbent ticket. In the first contested election for president of 
the AFL-CIO the debate centered on the role of the federation in orga­
nizing and the pace of change.
Donahue campaigned on his record as secretary-treasurer and 
chair of the Committee on the Evolution of Work, openly defending 
the deliberate nature of the modifications it had encouraged. Sweeney 
called for more aggressive leadership and radical change. Both candi­
dates argued for dramatic increases in organizing expenditures and 
promised to greatly expand the work of the Organizing Institute. 
Sweeney proclaimed that it was time to “work the streets as well as the 
suites.” Donahue replied that “street fights . . .  [are] a formula for disas­
ter.” The contrast was symbolized by Sweeney’s defense of “blocking 
bridges” and Donahue’s call for “building bridges.”2
Although each union casts weighted votes based on membership, 
AFL-CIO elections are not exercises in grassroots democracy. 
National union presidents tightly control their delegates and therefore 
the election outcome. Sweeney was supported by enough union presi­
dents to assure victory for his slate with 56 percent of the vote. The 
new officers assumed control on October 25,1995.
A  New Voice for American Workers
Sweeney, Trumka, and Chavez-Thompson ran as the “New Voice” 
team based on a platform that promised to “rebuild the American 
labor movement.” By the end of 1996 many of the specific proposals 
laid out during their campaign had been implemented and the AFL- 
CIO national office had been restructured accordingly.
The first priority was to establish for the federation a leadership role 
in organizing. A new Organizing Department was created with a $10 
million annual budget; Richard Bensinger was named director. The 
Organizing Institute’s program was expanded with the goal of recruit­
ing and training one thousand new organizers within two years. 
Internships in organizing for one thousand college students and young 
workers were established for the 1996 Union Summer. The AFL-CIO 
MasterCard agreement was renegotiated with much of the additional 
revenues earmarked for organizing. A $5 million organizing fund was 
established to assist innovative multi-union organizing campaigns.
The upshot of the primacy afforded to organizing is an effort to 
establish union growth as the priority for the labor movement.
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Although new staff at the AFL-CIO have critiqued the servicing 
model, the federation is not in a position to change the practice of na­
tional and local unions. Rather, by attempting to establish organizing 
as the top priority the federation is in effect signaling its intention to 
lead unions away from their dogged attachment to servicing.
Although there is no particular commitment to the organizing model 
as an alternative mode of operation, the AFL-CIO has supplemented its 
organizing initiatives with programs that incorporate mobilization of 
union members. Labor’s highly visible political campaign for the 1996 
congressional elections featured over $20 million in issue-oriented ad­
vertising, but also sought to build permanent grassroots organizations 
of politically active union members. The renamed Department of Field 
Mobilization, while focused on rejuvenating Central Labor Councils, is 
committed simultaneously to member mobilization as the best hope for 
reviving union activism at the community level.
Ultimately, the New Voice blueprint calls for returning to unions 
the type of economic and political power they wielded in the first 
quarter century after World War II. Part of the plan to recapture eco­
nomic power is a new Center for Strategic Campaigns. This center will 
seek to coordinate corporate campaign activities, to promote inter­
union solidarity, and to train union staff in the strategic deployment 
of corporate campaign tactics.
Under John Sweeney it is clear that the AFL-CIO is contesting the 
dinosaur image with new vigor. On the surface the components of the 
new initiatives look a lot like the plan spelled out in The Changing 
Situation in 1985. But there are two notable differences: the AFL-CIO is 
taking a much more aggressive leadership role, and significant re­
sources are being devoted to the effort. Whatever the end result, an 
immediate benefit of the flurry of activity has been increased visibility 
for unions. From a public relations perspective, Union Summer, the 
1996 political campaign, and the willingness of Sweeney, Trumka, and 
Chavez-Thompson to crisscross the country to appear in support of
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union causes have achieved a remarkable turnaround in the amount 
and tone of news coverage afforded to the labor movement. As yet 
unanswered is whether substantive results will match the anticipation.
The State of the Dinosaur, 1996
With unions representing only 10.4 percent of the private sector work­
force, it is clear that to avoid being marginalized the labor movement 
must undertake radical transformation. The election of John Sweeney 
and the level of energy and excitement among new staff at the AFL- 
CIO are refreshing signs after years of cautious restraint. Unfortu­
nately, these changes are insufficient to assure metamorphosis 
throughout the movement. Because of the decentralized structure of 
the federation, the key to success lies in the national unions and their 
locals. Although with its new aggressiveness the AFL-CIO may serve as 
a catalyst, lasting change ultimately depends on elected leaders and 
staff who are wedded to the old model. The servicing magnet is power­
ful, especially at the local level. Freeing resources for organizing and 
other initiatives is no easy task.
To understand the magnitude of the challenge, consider that unions 
need to organize about 300,000 new members per year in order 
merely to maintain the current density level (Labor Research 
Association, 1993). For the first half of 1996 unions won NLRB elec­
tions in units totaling 33,045 workers (Bureau of National Affairs, 
1996b). Based on recent experience, this will translate into about 
25,000 workers covered by union contracts, or one-sixth the amount 
needed to stay even.
G ain in g  th e  c o n sen su s  n e e d e d  to  d riv e  th e  o rg an iz in g  p r io r i ty  a l­
rea d y  is b e in g  co m p lica ted  b y  d isa g re em en ts  over strategy. T h e  new  
A FL -C IO  o rg an iz in g  p ro g ra m  is ro o te d  in  a tac tica l a p p ro a c h  th a t re ­
lies o n  m ilita n t d ire c t a c tio n  a n d  civil d iso b ed ien ce . As o n e  o rg a n iz ­
in g  d ire c to r  exp lains , “ T h ere ’s a re v o lu tio n  to  b e  had .” T app ing  anger
probably makes sense when organizing the targeted occupational 
groups identified by Bensinger as the priority: “immigrant janitors, 
low-wage healthcare workers, and low-wage service workers” (Labor 
Research Association, 1994). However, unions that organize profes­
sional, technical, and clerical workers are convinced that this type of 
appeal will not be sufficient in their campaigns, where lack of voice 
and a desire to influence management decisions provide additional 
motivation to unionize. While interested in independent representa­
tion, these white-collar workers often view continuous conflict as dis­
ruptive (Cohen and Hurd, 1998). It seems clear that different objective 
conditions will require different appeals; a narrow focus on one orga­
nizing scenario could serve to undermine consensus and restrict 
progress on the organizing front.
Underlying both this disagreement and the Sweeney-Donahue de­
bate over blocking bridges versus building bridges is an unspoken 
philosophical contradiction. The new AFL-CIO organizing program 
implicitly aims to rejuvenate labor based on appeals to class con­
sciousness. The detractors presume that efforts to rebuild must ad­
dress career and employment issues; they implicitly accept the reality 
of a labor movement defined by job consciousness. Even if militant 
tactics and appeals to class concerns are viewed merely as tools to 
reinject fighting spirit into unions, the impact of a half century of 
practice under the servicing model must be confronted. Moving 
elected leaders and staff from comfortable routines into a more ag­
gressive organizing mode is a significant challenge. Injecting life into 
the movement at the grass roots among a passive membership will be 
at least as difficult.
The most important contribution of John Sweeney and the AFL- 
CIO may be to project a vision that wins support from labor leaders 
and activists at all levels. In this regard what stands out is the decision 
to make union growth the objective by which all of the federation’s ac­
tivities are judged. Because union growth is an objective and not a 
model, it has broad appeal. It focuses attention on the organizing pri­
ority in a way that should make as much sense to those leaders who
merely want to regain market power as it does to those who yearn for 
a working class movement. The trick for Sweeney and national union 
leaders committed to his agenda will be to make a link between orga­
nizing for self-interest and organizing for social and economic justice. 
Taking wages out of competition is an important goal, but if the di­
nosaur image is to be slain labor must act as a champion of all work­
ing people and embrace a moral vision that includes economic and 
social justice.
Meanwhile, the key within the labor movement is to achieve major 
resource reallocation to support organizing. Gaining national and 
local leaders’ acceptance of a new set of budgetary priorities will be 
easier if they can be convinced that there will be a payoff in the form 
of membership growth. As a step toward solidifying commitment, 
achieving some major victories clearly tied to the AFL-CIO organiz­
ing program is essential.
It is difficult to conceive of a rejuvenated, reoriented, growing 
movement if all change emanates from the top. The involvement, 
commitment, inspiration, and leadership of union members also must 
be cultivated. Members need to be mobilized and trained to assume 
responsibility for representational work in order to free resources for 
organizing. They also should be recruited to participate in organizing 
and political action. In order for a new level of activism to be attained, 
members will have to rethink their passive role and their relationship 
to their unions. This points to the timeliness of a comprehensive edu­
cational program that challenges members to reach a new level of un­
derstanding about politics and economics, and helps them work 
through why organizing must be a priority.
Although programs that confront these issues are being designed 
by the AFL-CIO Education Department, it is not clear whether the re­
sources needed for the effort will be allocated by the federation and 
the national unions. At least one major union essentially shut down its 
education department in 1996 as it shifted resources into organizing. 
This seems to be a short-sighted decision; change at the top will be
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meaningless if union members do not buy into the new priorities and 
display excitement. Political will at the grass roots is crucial given the 
need to reallocate resources at all levels.
As labor contests the dinosaur image it will find no easy answers. 
Hard work, careful assessment of options, and a willingness to take 
risks are all required. Ultimately unions must reorient and become or­
ganizations that capture the full commitment of members and the 
imagination of unrepresented workers. Without widespread experi­
mentation and a significant reallocation of resources to organizing, 
extinction awaits.
Although a dramatic turnaround will be viewed as fantasy by many, 
the growing attention to organizing offers hope. Central to any resur­
gence will be the rekindling of enthusiasm for the conception of unions 
as a movement. The spirit and idealism implicit in such a notion and 
the hard work associated with it were captured by ACTWU President 
Jack Sheinkman on the occasion of the endowment of a chair at the ILR 
School in his name. Sheinkman reminisced about his career in the 
labor movement and closed with a refrain from an old union song: 
“Freedom doesn’t come like a bird on the wing, doesn’t come down like 
a summer rain. Freedom, freedom is a hard won thing. You’ve got to 
work for it! Fight for it! Day and night for it, and every generation’s got 
to win it again” (Lampell, 1983: 28). ■
Notes
1 This section is based on personal notes of the author, who attended the 
conference.
2 This synopsis is based on the author’s notes from the candidates’ debate at the 
October 1995 AFL-CIO convention in New York City.
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